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ABSTRACT
Existing judicial research has firmly established the role of the law and the courts
in the political system of the United States. Yet very little systematic empirical research
has been conducted to fully explore the extent to which theories of judicial behavior
based upon the American judicial system are applicable to other legal systems. As a
result, these theories lack generalizability and, moreover, have failed to determine if the
U.S. judiciary is comparable to other court systems or simply an anomaly within a
broader comparative framework.
Given this void within the existing literature, this study extends several theories of
judicial behavior developed in the American context to South Africa’s highest court, the
Appellate Division, throughout the time period 1950-1990—roughly the rise and fall of
apartheid.

Specifically, it employs an integrated approach derived from both the legal

and extralegal approaches of judicial decision making to a particularly salient issue area,
the death penalty, and discovers that ideology and race—rather than legal factors—are
perhaps the strongest predictors of death penalty decisions. The implications of these
findings are that judicial decision making is much more complex than what the legal
model suggests and, concomitantly, that theories of judicial behavior extrapolated from
the American context are capable of similarly determining the degree to which politics
plays a role within the legal system of South Africa.

iv

INTRODUCTION
Contemporary research in judicial politics has provided great insight into the
functioning of courts in the United States. Scholars have seemingly unveiled several of
the underlying processes that significantly affect judicial decision making, substantially
contributing to our knowledge of judicial behavior in the framework of such areas as
agenda setting (Perry 1991), strategic behavior (Murphy 1964; Maltzman and Wahlbeck
1996; Epstein and Knight 1998), ideological or preference voting (Schubert 1962; Segal
and Spaeth 1993, 2002) and the like. Yet these findings have been myopic in scope,
focusing primarily upon the U.S. courts and consequently neglecting courts within a
larger comparative context.
While studies on the American courts have been abundant, systematic empirical
research on courts outside of the U.S. has been sparse, as few works have attempted to
determine the role of law and the courts in other political systems.1 With the global
expansion of the “judicialization of politics” (Tate and Vallinder 1995),2 however,
scholars have steadily become more responsive to the need of the public law sub-field to
obtain a more thorough understanding of legal systems via comparative research. As a
result, judicial scholars have expanded their research into several countries including
examinations of the court systems of Spain (Toharia 1975; Giles and Lancaster 1989), the
Philippines (Haynie 1994, 1995), India (Epp 1998) Argentina (Helmke 2002) and South
Africa (Haynie 2003), among others.

1

For a similar criticism, see Gibson, Caldeira and Baird (1998).
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Tate and Vallinder (1995, 14) refer to the global expansion of judicial power, or the “judicialization of
politics” as “the infusion of judicial decision-making and of courtlike procedures into political arenas
where they did not previously reside.”
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Comparative judicial research is also necessary to establish the generalizability of
the judicial behavior theories posited by scholars of the American courts. Is the U.S.
legal system, on the whole, an anomaly? Or, conversely, is it similar to other judicial
systems? These are questions that can only be answered after exporting our theories of
judicial behavior to other court systems.
This study seeks to fill part of this void within the existing judicial literature by
applying judicial decision-making theories developed in the U.S. context to the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The primary goal is to determine the
degree to which politics plays a role within the judicial decision-making process of South
Africa’s highest appellate court of the apartheid era. Specifically, an integrated model of
decision making derived from both the legal and extralegal approaches to law is extended
to a single issue area, the death penalty, in order to ascertain whether or not judges do
indeed rely upon factors in addition to—or perhaps even exclusive of—the law in
determining case decisions.

2

LITERATURE REVIEW
Models of Judicial Behavior
One of the most enduring questions posed by scholars of judicial politics concerns
the basis upon which judges construct their decisions. Until the early 20th century, legal
scholars strictly subscribed to the belief that judges embraced a mechanical jurisprudence
approach to law, relying on stare decisis as the chief determinant in their case decisions.
The legal model of decision making is thus based upon the notion that judicial decisions
are solely derived from the framer’s intent, precedent or the “plain meaning” of the
statute or constitutional text and the facts of the case. According to 18th century British
jurist William Blackstone (1765, 69), judges were “living oracles” of the law and adhered
to precedent so that they were “not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion.” The
1920’s, however, began the era of legal realism; scholars began to recognize—or perhaps
to admit—that judges were influenced by factors other than simply law and precedent
(Pound 1910, 1922; Cohen 1914; Cardozo 1921; Llewellyn 1931).
This innovative belief quickly gave way to the judicial behavioralist movement,
which spawned a plethora of studies focusing on the role of personal preferences and
attitudes, as well as other extralegal factors, in the judicial decision-making process.
Among the first of these works was Pritchett’s (1948) study of the Roosevelt Court,
whereby he systematically analyzed the patterns of ideological alignment among the
justices of the Supreme Court.
Yet it was not until Schubert (1962) that a formal model of judicial decision
making was introduced into the field. Using a method of cumulative scaling, his findings
suggested that judges are influenced by their ideology and that their decisions are driven
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by these ideological preferences. Thus, justices vote in the direction of an issue that is
closest to them in their ideological space. Schubert’s measure of ideology, however, was
derived from the justices’ votes themselves, a tautological dilemma both theoretically and
methodologically. Nevertheless, this pivotal piece laid the groundwork for later
attitudinal models, highlighting the impact of ideology on judicial decision making
(Gibson 1978; Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1993).
Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002) are most widely credited for their work on the
attitudinal model and assert that decisions of Supreme Court justices are primarily based
upon their personal political attitudes and values. Segal and Spaeth (1993, 73) discount
the legal model, claiming that it is impossible to both accurately operationalize and
falsify. Instead, the attitudinal model contends that justices use their ideologies as a
guide to sift through the various legal factors presented and utilized in each case. Thus
the facts and the law are not irrelevant, but are inevitably filtered through the attitudes
and preferences of the judge.
In these analyses, the “circularity problem” of measuring ideology is avoided
through the use of independent measures created by Segal and Cover (1989).3 Now
considered the standard measure in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court, ideology is
captured through a content analysis of statements obtained from a number of newspaper
editorials throughout the nomination and confirmation processes for each Supreme Court
justice, from Warren to Kennedy. This technique has similarly been used to create
independent measures of ideology for judges at the state level (Traut and Emmert 1998).
Still others have used the judges’ appointing president (Tate 1981; Songer and Haire

3

Additional scores were later added by Segal et al. (1995).
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1992, 1994) and the political environment surrounding the Court (George and Epstein
1992) as alternative independent measures of judicial ideology.
Though most scholars would agree that political ideology does play a significant
role within judicial decisions, many admit that the attitudinal approach fails to paint a
complete picture of the overall judicial decision-making process and are rather hesitant to
wholly discount the role of legal factors within this process (e.g., Brenner and Stier 1996;
Brisbin 1996). As a result, several scholars have presented more complex models of
judicial behavior—those that not only include judicial ideology, but various other legal
and extralegal considerations as well (Songer and Haire 1992; George and Epstein 1992;
Knight and Epstein 1996; Songer and Lindquist 1996).
Within these integrated models, case characteristics are commonly used to test
both legal and extralegal approaches of judicial decision making. According to Segal
(1984, 892) the legal model “assumes decisions are based upon ‘standards set in
constitution, statute, precedent or court rule’.” On the other hand, the extralegal model
deals “with characteristics of the defendant that are legally irrelevant to the sentencing
decision.”4

Integrating these two models, Segal (1984; 1986) was one of the first

scholars to test the effect of case facts in analyses of the U.S. Supreme Court’s search and
seizure cases, with others quickly following suit. For instance, Songer and Haire (1992)
determined that facts in obscenity cases, along with ideology and precedent, are
important determinants of outcomes in U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Several others have also applied integrated approaches to a specific focus area,
most notably, the death penalty. Emmert and Traut (1994) and Traut and Emmert’s
4

In particular, Segal (1984) says that the race of the defendant is often closely examined.
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(1998) studies of the California Supreme Court demonstrated that case facts, coupled
with judicial ideology, are important determinants of death penalty decisions. Similarly,
Hall and Brace (1994; 1996) and Brace and Hall (1995; 1997) discovered that extralegal
characteristics, particularly the judges’ political affiliation, and legal characteristics,
specifically those that consider whether or not the capital murder involved statutorily
defined aggravating factors (e.g., robbery, rape, multiple victims), are significant
predictors of death penalty outcomes in U.S. State Supreme Courts. Also combining the
two main approaches to judicial decision making, George and Epstein (1992) determined
the significant influence of both legal (e.g., crime proportionality, jury death qualification
and both aggravating and mitigating circumstances) and extralegal factors (e.g., “repeat
player” status) on death penalty decisions before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Yet some scholars have challenged the validity of these legal based fact pattern
models. As mentioned above, Segal and Spaeth (1993, 65; 2002) have argued that it is the
attitudes of judges which drive decision making and that legal disputes are settled “in
light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus according to these scholars, it is theoretically impossible to
disentangle the effects of ideology from legal interpretation, since the latter is merely a
function of the former. Haynie et al. (2002) are among the few to have disputed this legal
fact pattern approach, with their results closely coinciding with the assertions made by
Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002): significant support was found for the attitudinal model of
judicial decision making, while none was found for the legal model.
In addition to ideology and case characteristics, research has further demonstrated
that success in court is often contingent upon litigant resources (Kleck 1981; Clarke and
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Koch 1976; Farrell and Swigert 1986). “Repeat players,” or those possessing greater
resources in terms of wealth, experience and rapport with the court on account of
repeated litigation,5 are more likely to achieve success in case outcomes than “one
shotters,” or those possessing lesser amounts of these resources6 (Galanter 1974).
For instance, Songer and Sheehan (1992) found that “upperdogs” (e.g., state, local
and federal government) fare better than “underdogs” (e.g., individuals) in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. McGuire (1995) found a significant influential effect of counsel
experience and determined that the “haves” usually achieve greater litigation success in
the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, it is the executive branch’s representative, the
Solicitor General, who enjoys the most success before the Court (McGuire 1998). Others
(e.g., George and Epstein 1992; Haynie et al. 2002) have also found similar results.
Yet the degree to which resources are relevant in court outcomes has also been
contested.

Sheehan, Mishler and Songer (1992) found that judicial ideology has a

stronger impact on litigation success than do differences among litigants in terms of their
resources and expertise in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, it may be
that Galanter’s (1974) theory of resource inequality is not applicable to all judicial
contexts. For instance, Haynie (1994, 769) discovered that in the Philippines the “have
nots” achieve greater success than the “haves,” because the Philippine Supreme Court
serves a “redistributive function” in order to “enhance its legitimacy as a political
institution.” Similar results were also evident in South Africa (Haynie 2003).

5

E.g., prosecutors or insurance companies (97).

6

E.g., the criminally accused or a spouse in a divorce case (97).

7

Existing literature on the U.S. legal system therefore suggests that factors in
addition to both law and precedent are evident within the judicial decision-making
process. But are these theories of judicial behavior merely idiosyncratic? Or are these
findings applicable to courts outside of the U.S. as well?
The South African Judicial Context
South Africa’s struggle with race relations undeniably has been both lengthy and
arduous. Entrenched within this struggle has been its legal system, and one institution
that has played a particularly prominent role is South Africa’s highest court, the
Appellate Division. South Africa was officially formed with the South Africa Act of
1909, which combined the four British colonies of South Africa into the Union of South
Africa (Forsyth 1985, 1). Along with this Act, the legislature created the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. Replacing the superior courts of the
former colonies, the Appellate Division was designed to serve as an appeal court. Yet it
did not serve as South Africa’s final appellate court until the 1950 abolition of the Privy
Council, making the Appellate Division the South Africa’s highest court, or its court of
last resort (Dugard 1978, 10; Forsyth 1985, 2; Haynie 2003, 31).
Although apartheid, or the separation of the races, had been a component of
South African governance since the arrival of white settlers in 1652, more extreme and
systematic separation measures followed the National Party Government’s rise to power
in 1948 (Dugard 1978, 6). Upon gaining control of the government, the National Party
specifically sought to accomplish two goals: (1) restore the power of the government to
its Afrikaner heritage; and (2) institutionalize apartheid (Haynie 2003, 33).

8

The National Party’s goals were not so easily achieved, however, and its power
was initially curtailed somewhat by the Appellate Division’s power to determine
legislative acts to be ultra vires, or beyond the scope of the constitutionally derived
powers of Parliament (Ellmann 1992, 104-112). Using the “separate but equal” doctrine
derived from the British common law, the Court negated several attempts of the
legislature to separate the races. In response to the Court, however, the legislature passed
the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951, which was designed to establish
separate public facilities among the races (Haynie 2003, 34).
The Appellate Division was further weakened as a result of the Appellate
Division Quorum Act 27 of 1955. This act was the National Party’s response to the
Court’s invalidation of the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 and was
intended to remove the “coloureds” from the voting rolls by a simple majority vote rather
than the two-thirds vote constitutionally mandated (Forsyth 1985, 14; Ellmann 1992,
13).7 The Act succeeded in limiting the Court’s power of judicial review by increasing
the required quorum on “most” cases to five and a quorum of 11 in cases dealing with the
legality of Acts of Parliament (Forsyth 1985, 15). Since only six judges comprised the
Court at that time, the Act called for the appointment of five additional judges, thus
“diluting” the power of the incumbent members of the Court with the inclusion of these
new judges.8

7

“Coloured” is a term of reference for individuals of mixed race. Its use in South Africa does not carry the
negative connotations associated with its use in the United States. It should be noted that black voters had
been previously removed with the requisite two-thirds majority. The National Party wanted to ensure the
franchise for whites only.
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The size of Parliament was also expanded to achieve the requisite two-thirds and the “coloured” voters
were “constitutionally” removed from the voter rolls.
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Thus the Appellate Division consisted of a Chief Justice and a varying number of
Judges of Appeal,9 all of whom were white, given that a black judge never served on the
Court during the era of apartheid (Dugard 1978, 11). Before the 1961 Constitution Act,
judges of the Appellate Division were chosen by the Governor General (Haynie 2003,
31), but after 1961 were appointed by the cabinet, or the State President-in-Council
(Dugard 1978, 10). The retirement age was 70, and judges could not be removed unless
by both request of Parliament and permission of the State President on the basis of
“misbehavior” or “incapacity” (Dugard 1978, 10). As a result of this design, Dugard
(1978, 11) stated, “Inevitably, political considerations play[ed] an important part in the
appointment of judges.” Indeed they did, since at one point in its history more than half
of the Court was staffed by appointees and presumed supporters of the National Party
(Haynie 2003).
The structural weakness of the Court therefore left it susceptible to the political
influences of the apartheid system, consequently creating the potential to shape judicial
decision making. Nevertheless, Dugard (1978, 71-72) claimed that the common law of
South Africa was “color-blind” and that the courts theoretically should not distinguish
between blacks and whites in terms of basic civil rights and freedoms, with the exception
of those rights specifically limited by the legislature. Similarly, Haynie (2003, 26) says
that “judges were trained to appreciate the rule of law” and that the Roman-Dutch
tradition “required that individual freedom be protected and only in those instances where
Parliament specifically dictated inequality or specifically limited rights would courts
sanction such restrictions” (115).

9

There were six Judges of Appeal in 1950 but by 1990 had grown to 18 (Haynie 2003, 31).
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Despite this legal rhetoric, it is apparent that the Court functioned within a
political environment to which it was undoubtedly not immune. In this respect, did the
stacking of the court in favor of the government succeed in creating a court that simply
mirrored the political disposition of South Africa’s authoritarian regime? Or was the
Court capable of maintaining its independence and using its own discretion to challenge
the regime’s repressive apartheid policies? In a country that forbade the “scandalizing”
and “contempt” of the Court,10 little research has been conducted on South Africa’s legal
system to empirically test these questions.
Given these conditions, the case of South Africa not only provides a unique
opportunity to examine the role of political ideology in the judicial decision-making
process, but it also allows for a critical analysis of the role that other legal and extralegal
factors may have played within the opinions of the Appellate Division during the reign of
the National Party and its political progeny, apartheid.

One area of law that is

particularly amenable to such an analysis is that of the death penalty (e.g., Emmert and
Traut 1994; Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Traut and Emmert
1998).

This specific issue area is chosen because ideology is assumed to play a

particularly critical role within the death penalty sentencing process. Because the issue
at stake was, of course, the life or death of the defendant, it is assumed that ideologies
among the judges were much more exacerbated in these types of cases than in less
divisive areas of law. Thus the salience of ideology within death penalty cases makes

10

One of the most famous cases to involve the “scandalization of the court” is that of Professor Van
Niekerk of the University of Natal (Durban) who published an article in the South African Law Journal,
which addressed the possibility that sentencing differed among black and white defendants in capital
punishment cases. He was charged with “contempt of the court” for “bring[ing] the judiciary into
contempt, to violate their dignity and respect, and to cast suspicion upon the administration of justice”
(Dugard 1978, 292-293).
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this issue area more conducive to analyzing the various political forces at play within the
judicial decision making process.
Much like the United States, capital punishment has long been an appendage of
South Africa’s legal system. Prior to South Africa’s 1990 moratorium on the death
penalty and subsequent reforms in its criminal laws (Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 11-13),
the sentence of death could either be compulsory, or based upon judicial discretion for
cases involving murder.11 In either type of case, however, it was the judges who decided
whether or not extenuating circumstances were present, thus leaving the determination of
the existence of these factors subject to judicial discretion. For murder cases in which the
judge deemed an absence of extenuating circumstances, the death penalty was statutorily
mandated. Conversely, in cases of murder for which the judge deemed the presence of
extenuating circumstances, sentences were then statutorily dependent upon judicial
discretion, in which judges—not the law—determined the imposition of the death
penalty.
Extenuating circumstances were analogous to the mitigating circumstances
currently employed by several U.S. states within their death penalty sentencing schemes.
They were designed to provide a means of decreasing the moral culpability of the
defendant, and examples of these circumstances included the youthfulness of the
defendant,12 a woman convicted of killing her newly born child,13 the influence of
alcohol or drugs, witchcraft and the presence of a psychopathic condition, among others.
Crimes also warranting the death penalty—though not statutorily mandating it—were
11

In 1995 the death penalty was finally deemed unconstitutional by the new Constitutional Court in State v
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).

12

The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 (2)(a)
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The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 (2)(a)

12

treason, kidnapping, child-stealing, rape, robbery and attempted robbery, housebreaking,
sabotage or terrorism (Hiemstra 1977, 146-147; Dugard 1977, 103).
Also similar to the legal system of the United States, South Africa provided legal
counsel to its indigent defendants. Yet its pro deo, or literally “for God,” system of
counsel was only available to indigent defendants in death penalty cases heard before the
Appellate Division, or its highest court (Dugard 1977, 46). Separate from other forms of
legal aid funded by tariffs, the pro deo system was not mandated by law, but rather was
an “established” tradition practiced by the Court (McQuoid-Mason 1982, 11). Pro deo
advocates were appointed to cases by the Bar Council and were usually private
practitioners, paid R200 a day by the state and generally not provided an attorney for
assistance14 (McQuoid-Mason 1982, 12; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5). Moreover, pro
deo advocates are usually the “most junior” and “inexperienced” within the legal
profession (Van Niekerk 1969, 72-73; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5), lacking what
Galanter (1974) referred to as “repeat player” status before the Court.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Appellate Division lacked discretionary
control over its docket. Appeals to the Appellate Division generally arrived to the Court
via two routes: (1) cases were either certified to it from the lower courts15; or (2)
petitioners denied leave to appeal in the lower courts could seek reprieve directly from
the Appellate Division. Appeals resulting from the former were much more common
than the latter, and a result of this design is that the Court’s docket was largely comprised
of leaves to appeal which they were required to hear (Haynie 2003). Therefore, it may be
14

Attorneys usually assist advocates by gathering pertinent information, e.g., interviewing witnesses or
investigating the facts surrounding the case (Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5).

15

It should be noted though that lower court judges were expected to refuse to grant leaves to appeal in
cases that lacked substantive questions of law.
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that these disputes represented routine legal challenges easily disposed of by the Court,
rather than major constitutional and statutory disputes that were more likely to engender
disagreement.
Yet the Appellate Division was able to maintain a minimal amount of discretion
in cases arriving to the Court in the more atypical route, or rather, through appeals by
petitioners seeking reprieve from the Appellate Division.

In the context of capital

punishment, it is plausible that the Court was more willing to accept a reprieve in this
case, because a denial surely meant death for the petitioner.

Another potential

consequence of this discretion is that the Court potentially would be less likely to take a
case that it would confirm, since this would not only seem unnecessary, but it also would
be politically problematic under apartheid circumstances in which the Court's legitimacy
was already in question. Therefore, the Court may have been more likely to both accept
and reverse the death penalty when these various factors were taken into consideration. It
is possible then that case outcomes substantively differed based upon the route by which
they arrived at the Court.
Juxtaposing South Africa with the United States, it is clear both the
commonalities and differences that existed between the two legal systems. In both
systems the death penalty had long been considered a conventional form of punishment,
and the sentencing structure within each system statutorily permitted a defined amount of
judicial discretion. But unlike its democratic counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Appellate Division lacked control over its own docket and, further, was embedded within
an authoritarian apartheid regime. Notwithstanding these variances, if theories based
upon the U.S. judicial system are truly generalizable, the effects of both legal and

14

extralegal factors found within the American context should similarly appear in the
comparative framework of South Africa. Therefore, in combining the various elements
of South Africa’s death penalty system along with its political history, it is quite evident
that the Appellate Division is ripe for this type of exploration.

15

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Grounded in both evidence and theory posited by scholars of the U.S. courts, this
study explores the extent to which politics plays a role within the judicial decisionmaking process of the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990—roughly the rise
and fall of apartheid in South Africa. Specifically, it examines the effects of both legal
and extralegal factors within this overall process.
Guided by existing models of judicial behavior presented throughout the
literature, the legal model is operationalized through the use of legal characteristics, or
facts statutorily related to the law, provided in each individual case. Concomitantly, the
extralegal model consists of judicial ideology, litigant resources and facts unrelated to the
law surrounding each case. Recognizing the significant attention scholars have given to
both models of judicial behavior, this study combines the two in order to create a more
complex, integrated approach of judicial decision making and applies this model to the
case of South Africa.
The scope of judicial decision making is confined to a single issue area, in this
case, the death penalty, in order to meaningfully analyze the effects of both legal and
extralegal factors on case decisions, which is a method consistent with a number of
studies throughout the literature (Segal 1984, 1986; George and Epstein 1992; Songer
and Haire 1992; Emmert and Traut 1994; Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall
1995, 1997; Traut and Emmert 1998). The source of data utilized in this study was
obtained from a dataset compiled by Haynie (2003), which includes all published cases of
the South African Appellate Division throughout the time period 1950-1990.
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Over the course of the 41-year time period studied, the Court published 220 cases
in which the primary issue was the death penalty. Using these cases, a statistical model is
estimated to depict the death penalty decisions of the Appellate Division as a function of
legal and extralegal case facts, judicial ideology, litigant resources and the type of appeal
granted to the Appellate Division. Additional models are employed to estimate the
interaction effects of judicial ideology when combined with legal case facts, included to
determine the influence of ideology in interpreting legal stimuli. Because the outcome of
death penalty decisions is estimated, the dependent variable in this analysis is either to
affirm (coded 1) or to overturn the death sentence (coded 0).

Due to the dichotomous

nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is used in the estimation of
the statistical models.
The Legal Model: Crime Characteristics
In much of the current research, crime characteristics are often included as a
means of gauging the degree to which legal factors play a role within the judicial
decision-making process, and the legal model has generally been operationalized through
measures based upon legal doctrine (e.g., Segal 1984, 1986; George and Epstein 1992;
Hall and Brace 1994, 1996; Brace and Hall 1995, 1997). As discussed above, South
African law deemed appropriate the sentence of death for cases involving murder,
treason, kidnapping, child-stealing, rape, robbery and attempted robbery, housebreaking,
sabotage or terrorism and mandatory for murder cases lacking extenuating circumstances
(Dugard 1977, 103). Therefore, in order to effectively operationalize the legal model of
judicial behavior, these various aspects of the South African law must be incorporated
into the analyses.

17

In cases of murder in which there were no extenuating circumstances either
presented by the defendant or found by the judge, judges at the trial level were statutorily
required to impose the death sentence. Based on this legal doctrine, it is expected that
the Appellate Division will affirm the lower courts’ decisions when the murder case
(MURDER) does not possess extenuating circumstances (coded 1 if present; 0 if
otherwise), as determined by the Court. On the other hand, because the law allows
judges to find extenuating circumstances as a means of decreasing the defendants’ moral
culpability in cases of murder (MURDEXT), it is posited that the Court will be more
likely to overturn the death sentence when extenuating circumstances are present (coded
1; 0 if otherwise). Likewise, it is expected that the Court will be more likely to overturn
the sentence when the case involves crimes considered less serious than murder
(OTHER), such as robbery or rape (coded 1; 0 if otherwise).
The Extralegal Model: Ideology, Case Facts and Litigant Resources
A plethora of research on the U.S. courts has clearly demonstrated the effect of
ideology on judicial decisions. However, measures of ideology comparable to those of
Segal (1984) and Segal et al. (1995), which would be helpful to test the effects of this
variable, are unavailable for the South African judges. In order to create an independent
measure of ideology to be included in the models, the ideology for each judge16 is
obtained by calculating the percentage of liberal, or “pro-underdog,” votes cast in all
criminal cases, excluding the votes cast in all death penalty decisions.17 The benefits to

16

Individual ideology is a dichotomous variable (1 = vote to affirm the criminal sentence, a “conservative”
decision; 3 = vote to overturn the criminal sentence, a “liberal” decision).

17

It should be noted that judges with fewer than five votes in criminal cases are excluded from the analysis.
When this occurs, the panel ideology is calculated using the ideology of the remaining judges on the panel.
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this approach are two-fold. First, the votes cast in the Court’s criminal cases will most
closely coincide with the ideology associated with death penalty cases. Second, by
removing the death penalty votes, Schubert’s (1962) tautology or “circularity problem” of
predicting votes via the votes themselves is safely avoided.
The Appellate Division generally sat in panels of three judges, but for more
“complex” criminal cases, sat in panels of five (Haynie 2003, 32). Because of this
design, the average ideology of the panel (PANLIB) is calculated for each death penalty
case. Theory suggests that liberal judges are more concerned than conservative judges
with protecting individual rights and liberties, particularly for defendants in criminal
cases. Therefore, an inverse relationship is expected to exist between the panel ideology
and the death penalty outcome, because as the ideology mean increases—thus becoming
more liberal, or “pro-underdog,”—the more likely the panel is expected to overturn the
death penalty.
Similar to the legal model of judicial behavior, extralegal models are also
operationalized through the use of case facts. In empirical studies of the death penalty,
scholars have included both defendant and victim characteristics in their analyses.
According to Segal (1984, 892), models of extralegal factors usually include a focus on
the defendants’ race. As a result, many scholars have demonstrated the negative effects
of race in the U.S. judicial system, particularly in terms of case disposition (Redelet
1981; Paternoster 1984; Haynie and Dover 1994) and sentence severity (Zatz 1984;
Albonetti 1997). Research has thus demonstrated that black defendants are those most
likely to be indicted for capital murder and generally receive harsher sentences than white
defendants.
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In the case of South Africa, comparable assertions have been made about the role
of race in death penalty sentencing. Van Niekerk (1969; 1970), a well-known South
African scholar, not only questioned the validity of capital punishment but also charged
that race was frequently applied to the sentencing process. In a survey study of South
African advocates, Van Niekerk (1969) discovered that over half of his sample believed
that capital punishment was “meted out on a differential basis to the different races”
(467). Extending theory derived from both the American and South African literatures, a
positive relationship is expected between race (DEFRACE) and sentencing outcomes in
that non-black defendants (coded 1) will be more likely than white defendants (coded 0)
to have their death sentences affirmed.18
The gender of the defendant is another possible determinant of sentencing
outcomes. Scholars have discovered that convicted males receive harsher penalties than
convicted females (Albonetti 1997; Farrell and Swigert 1986). One possible theory is
that judges often espouse paternalistic beliefs towards women, thus resulting in sentence
differentials between male and female defendants.

Based on this theoretical

understanding, it is expected that male defendants (coded 1) will be more likely than
female defendants (coded 0) to receive the death penalty (DEFMALE).
Relatedly, sentencing outcomes are often associated with victim characteristics,
and among these, the most notable is the gender of the victim.

Research has

demonstrated that adjudication is more severe when the victim is female than when the

18

An important caveat must be noted regarding the coding of the race variable. The defendants’ race is not
always available in the text of the case. In these instances, the race of the defendant is derived from the
defendants’ name, as listed in the case title, e.g., State v. Hlongwana 1975 (4) SA 567 (A).
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victim is male (Farrell and Swigert 1986).19 One possible explanation is that females are
perceived as more vulnerable within society, and, consequently, the sentence of death is
deemed more appropriate in such cases. Likewise, children are perceived by society in
this manner, and a similar underlying theoretical basis can be assumed when the victim is
a child. Therefore, in cases when the victim is a female or child (VICFEML), it is
expected that the panel will be more likely to affirm the sentence (coded 1; 0 if
otherwise) than when the victim is an adult male (VICMALE [coded 1; 0 if otherwise]).20
In several key pieces throughout the literature, litigant resources have been
significantly related to court outcomes (Galanter 1974; Songer and Sheehan 1992;
McGuire 1996), though the results have been somewhat mixed (Sheehan, Mishler and
Songer 1992; Haynie 1994). In death penalty cases, however, the defendant is clearly the
“underdog” or “have not” in relation to the state, which has an obligation to administer
justice. On the whole, defendants possess fewer monetary resources than the state, and,
further, criminal defendants lack the “repeat player” advantage also enjoyed by the state
(Galanter 1974; George and Epstein 1992).
In South Africa scholars of the legal system have sharply criticized the pro deo
system of counsel, charging that advocates in this system are often the most
“inexperienced” and “junior” within the legal profession (Van Niekerk 1969, 72-73;
Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5). As a result, it is expected that the death sentence will be
19

Others such as Brace and Hall (1995; 1997) and Hall and Brace (1994; 1996) have incorporated “female”
into their integrated models of judicial behavior, but have used this measure as a means of operationalizing
the legal model. This approach is not appropriate in the case of South Africa, because the gender of the
victim is statutorily irrelevant in death penalty sentencing. Theoretically, however, it may be used as an
extralegal factor in sentencing considerations.
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Though it would be very interesting to analyze the extralegal effects of additional victim characteristics
in each of the death penalty cases, such as the victims’ age and race, these data are not consistently
provided within the published cases of the Appellate Division.
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affirmed when advocates are pro deo (PRODEO), or appointed by the Court (coded 1),
than when they are not appointed by the Court (coded 0).
The structure of the appeal process resulted in the Court’s inability to control its
own docket. Yet the Court was able to maintain a limited amount of discretion through
its acceptance of cases from direct leaves of appeal. Theoretically, it may be that the
Court, in order to avoid diluting its own power in the context of apartheid wherein its
legitimacy was already threatened, did not accept cases that would simply lead to an
affirmation of the lower court’s decision. With this said, it is plausible that the Court
would not only be more likely to accept death penalty cases—since the denial of a leave
to appeal would almost certainly mean death for the appellant—but that these cases
would also result in reversals. Therefore, it is expected that when the Appellate Division
grants the leave to appeal (ADGRANT [coded 1; 0 if otherwise]), the Court will be more
likely to reverse the outcome of the lower court than if the case arrives from the more
typical route, a leave of appeal granted by the lower court (TRIAL [coded 1; 0 if
otherwise]).21
Finally, scholars such as Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002) have strongly contested
the credibility of the legal model, arguing that it is theoretically impossible to disentangle
the effects of personal preferences and attitudes from legal interpretation.

Thus

according to the attitudinal model of decision making, legal interpretation is merely a
function of ideology. Further exploring this argument, the specified legal factors are
interacted with ideology and included within a second model to test whether or not the

21

It should be noted that two separate variables were created in order to overcome the problem of missing
data for this measure.
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use of these legal measures significantly differs among the panels (i.e., among liberal and
conservative panels). If differences are found to exist, then the findings will simply serve
to reaffirm the assertions of the attitudinal model of decision making.
The multiplicative terms are specifically used within the analyses to gauge the
strength of the linkage between legal interpretation and the Court’s decisions as ideology
varies, and they include as follows:
circumstances

(PANLIB*MURDER);

ideology and murder with no extenuating
and

ideology

and

other

serious

crimes

(PANLIB*OTHER). Because liberal panels are expected to be those most likely to
overturn the death penalty, negative coefficients are posited for the interaction variables.
This implies that as ideology increases—thus becoming more liberal—the relationship
between the usage of legal factors and the Court’s decisions strengthens. The implication
of this hypothesis is that the presence of certain legal factors should have a more
pronounced effect for liberal panels than for their conservative counterparts. Intuitively,
this makes sense. Conservative panels, which generally rule in favor of the state, are
potentially more likely to affirm the sentence of death, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the case (i.e., the presence or absence of extenuating circumstances). On the
other hand, liberal panels, which tend to rule in favor of the defendant, are more likely to
overturn the sentence.

Since liberals should be more likely to overturn the death

sentence, they should particularly be more likely to do so in cases wherein they are
permitted more discretion, or rather, in those cases whereby judicial discretion is
statutorily defined (i.e., cases with the presence of extenuating circumstances).
Although the full (interaction) model will reveal the potential significant
differences in the effect of ideology across the specified legal factors, it will not provide a
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means of testing the degree to which the presence of these factors significantly impacts
the Court’s decision to either affirm or overturn the sentence of death. Furthermore,
because it also controls for the other variables within the model—such as the extralegal
factors and the type of leave to appeal granted—there is no way to compare these effects
across the different types of legal stimuli. Subsequent models are thus included to
separate out these various effects on the Court’s decisions and are filtered by the three
specified legal factors.
In summary, several statistical models are proposed to examine the effects of both
legal and extralegal factors on the decision making process of the Appellate Division of
South Africa throughout the time period 1950-1990. First, death penalty decisions before
the Court are depicted as a function of legal and extralegal case facts, ideology, litigant
resources and the form of leave to appeal granted to the defendant. A second model that
includes interaction terms is employed to test the effect of judicial ideology when
coupled with legal characteristics. Finally, three separate models for each of the three
legal factors are estimated to determine the direct impact of the legal factors on the
Court’s decisions.

Extending theory derived from the existing American judicial

literature, this study posits that the affirmation of the capital sentence is dependent upon
the severity of the crime, the conservatism of the panel, the type of leave to appeal
granted, whether the victim is a female or a child and, finally, if the defendant is male,
nonwhite or represented by pro deo counsel. Moreover, the attitudinal model of decision
making assumes that ideology will have an interactive effect with the use of legal stimuli.
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RESULTS
Table 1 presents the logistic regression estimates of both the baseline and full
models of death penalty decisions in the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990.
The onset of the results presents an unexpected surprise: none of the variables employed
within the baseline model have a strong and significant effect on the Court’s death
penalty decisions.

Chi-square does indicate, however, that the overall model is

significant.
First, there is no evidence to support the legal model of judicial decision making
within the baseline model. In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, one of the legal
variables, murder with extenuating circumstances, is dropped from the analysis, and the
effect of this measure is effectively captured in the intercept. It was posited that the
Court would be more likely to affirm the trial or lower court’s decision when the case of
murder lacked extenuating circumstances and, concomitantly, that the Court would
overturn the sentence of death in cases of murder with the presence of extenuating
circumstances or in cases based upon other serious crimes. Yet all three of the legal
variables, MURDER, OTHER and MURDEXT, the effect of which is captured within
the intercept, fail to reach any levels of statistical significance, indicating that the
Appellate Division was neither more nor less likely to depend upon these particular legal
factors within its sentencing process.
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Table 1. Baseline and Full (Interactive) Models of Death Penalty Decisions in the
South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990
Baseline Model
Variable

Full (Interactive) Model

b

s.e.

b

s.e.

MURDER

0.336

0.335

-1.788

1.863

PANLIB*MURDER

--------

--------

5.094

4.553

OTHER

0.168

0.510

-7.757***

3.215

PANLIB*OTHER

--------

--------

18.555++

7.602

PANLIB

-2.365*

1.785

-4.889***

2.171

DEFRACE

-0.660+

0.344

-0.607+

0.353

DEFMALE

7.563

18.158

7.555

18.236

VICFEML

0.650

0.539

0.632

0.548

VICMALE

0.018

0.518

-0.024

0.525

PRODEO

-0.073

0.322

-0.082

0.330

TRIAL

0.042

0.488

-0.135

0.506

ADGRANT

-0.522

0.545

-0.750*

0.566

Constant

-6.071

18.179

-4.782

18.267

2

Pseudo R
0.098
0.132
Chi Square
22.349***
30.529***
N
216
216
+++
*** prob. <0.01, using a 1-tailed test;
prob. <0.01, using a 2-tailed test
++
prob. <0.05, using a 2-tailed test
** prob. <0.05, using a 1-tailed test;
* prob. <0.10, using a 1-tailed test; + prob. <0.10, using a 2-tailed test

The role of litigant resources in decisions before the Court has also not been fully
established within this initial analysis. Based on Galanter’s (1974) theory of resource
inequality and the various criticisms lodged at South Africa’s pro deo system (Van
Niekerk 1969, 72-73; Sloth-Nielson et al. 1991, 5), it was expected that the presence of
pro deo counsel would lead to an affirmation of the lower court’s imposition of the death
penalty. Although the sign is in its expected negative direction, the insignificance of the

26

PRODEO coefficient demonstrates that the relationship between litigant resources and
court outcomes does not necessarily exist, since defendants represented by appointed
counsel were neither more nor less likely to have their sentence of death affirmed.
The way by which the leave to appeal to the Appellate Division was granted also does
not seem to have influenced the Court’s decisions. Theoretically, it makes sense that the
Court would have been more likely to overturn the sentence of death in cases whereby it
granted the leave to appeal. But the insignificance of the coefficients of both ADGRANT
and TRIAL does not provide evidence for this assumption, since there appears to be no
systematic relationship between the form of leave granted and the death penalty decisions
of the Court.
The results also indicate that the extralegal case facts within the baseline model—
with the possible exception of race—are not significant predictors of the Appellate
Division’s decisions. For instance, it was posited that the Court would be more likely to
affirm the sentence when the defendant was male, based upon the notion that judges often
tend to treat female defendants more leniently than their male counterparts. Despite its
correct positive direction, the insignificance of the DEFMALE coefficient demonstrates
that the judges of the Appellate Division were neither more nor less likely to affirm the
sentence of death for either male or female defendants.
It also appears that the Court did not rely upon the victims’ characteristics. It was
suggested that females and children were considered the most vulnerable within society,
leading to the hypothesis that the death penalty would be considered more appropriate in
cases involving these types of victims. The findings do not support this suggestion,

27

however, as is evidenced by the insignificant coefficients of both the VICFEML and
VICMALE variables.
On the other hand, there does appear to be some sort of link between the panels’
ideology and the sentencing outcomes of the Appellate Division. It was posited that
liberal panels, or those most committed to upholding the civil rights and liberties of
criminal defendants, would be more likely than conservative panels to overturn the
sentence of death. The negative coefficient of PANLIB (significant at the .10 level)
suggests some support for this hypothesis. However, the null hypothesis that the slope
coefficient is equal to zero cannot be rejected, nor can it be fully determined whether or
not a significant relationship exists between panel ideology and the Court’s decisions.
Another potentially important finding to emerge from the results involves the use of
the defendants’ race within the sentencing process. Based on the findings of the U.S.
courts and the assertions of a minority of South African scholars, it was posited that the
Court would be more likely to affirm the death sentence when the defendant was
nonwhite. The negative coefficient of DEFRACE (significant at the .10 level, using a
two-tailed test) demonstrates the opposite effect, specifically that the Court was more
likely to overturn the sentence of death in these instances. Again, however, the null
hypothesis that no relationship exists between race and sentencing cannot be confidently
rejected.
Thus the initial results reveal very little about the decision-making process of the
Appellate Division, demonstrating no support for the legal model and modest support for
the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. Is it possible then to conclude that the
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theoretical basis derived from the American context simply fails to similarly relate to the
case of South Africa? A more complex model is needed in order to test this possibility.
Table 1 further presents the logistic regression estimates of the full (interactive)
model of death penalty decisions of the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990,
which includes interactions between panel ideology and the legal variables, in addition to
the variables included within the initial analysis. Several of the hypotheses remain
unsupported, and, once more, there appears to be no systematic link between the
decisions of the Court and the victims’ characteristics, the defendants’ gender or the
presence of pro deo counsel.
The coefficient for DEFRACE, however, continues to be in an unexpected negative
direction but, yet again, is only significant at the more relaxed .10 level. It also appears
that the type of leave granted to appeal to the Court now has some effect. Despite its
significance at the weaker .10 level, the negative coefficient of ADGRANT is consistent
with theoretical expectations that the Court would be more likely to overturn the death
penalty in cases whereby it granted the leave to appeal.
Although the initial findings are substantively important to understanding the
Court’s decisions, the inclusion of the interactions reveal a much more interesting—
perhaps even puzzling—story.

As mentioned above, the multiplicative terms are

included as a means of gauging the effect of legal interpretation as ideology varies. The
findings suggest that this phenomenon has indeed occurred within the Court’s decisions,
particularly vis-à-vis the cases left up to judicial discretion.
Once again, to avoid perfect multicollinearity within the model it is necessary to
drop a legal variable from the analysis.
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Theoretically, murder with extenuating

circumstances is the most important legal variable among the three. It is in these types of
cases that liberal judges are potentially most likely to overturn the sentence of death
because judicial discretion is statutorily built into the death-sentencing scheme.
Therefore, MURDEXT is dropped from the analysis to test: (1) whether or not ideology
has a significantly different effect for this type of case than it has for others; and (2)
whether or not the effect is significantly related to the outcome of the case. Since the
effects of ideology for both MURDER and OTHER are captured within their respective
interaction coefficients, the coefficient for ideology, PANLIB, serves to capture the effect
of ideology in cases possessing extenuating circumstances.
Inspecting the PANLIB coefficient, ideology has a clear and significant effect on
cases of murder with extenuating circumstances. First, the high significance level (at the
.01 level) of the coefficient suggests that ideology has a more pronounced effect for cases
possessing extenuating circumstances than it does for other types of cases. Second, the
negative direction of the coefficient demonstrates that the effect of ideology is
significantly related to reversals in cases possessing extenuating circumstances.
Therefore, the findings are consistent with theoretical expectations and illustrate that
there is a significant difference between liberal and conservative panels for cases
involving extenuating circumstances and, specifically, that liberal panels were
significantly more likely than conservative panels to overturn the sentence of death.
A similar relationship does not seem to exist in cases of murder without
extenuating circumstances. The insignificant coefficient of PANLIB*MURDER reveals
that ideology does not have a significantly different effect for these types of cases,
suggesting that perhaps liberal panels were neither more nor less likely than conservative
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panels to overturn the sentence of death in these specific cases.

Furthermore, the

insignificant coefficient of MURDER indicates that the absence of extenuating
circumstances in cases of murder was unrelated to the Court’s decisions.
Another interesting finding consistent with theoretical expectations is that the
Court was more likely to overturn the sentence of death for less serious crimes, which is
indicated by the negative and highly significant (at the .01 level) coefficient of OTHER.
One puzzling finding, however, concerns the interaction between other serious crimes
and ideology. The results reveal a positive coefficient for PANLIB*OTHER, which
seems to indicate that more liberal panels were more likely to affirm the sentence of
death for cases involving other serious crimes. Theoretically, this relationship makes no
sense. However, this measure only reveals whether or not a significant difference in the
effect of ideology exists for cases involving other serious crimes in comparison to cases
without extenuating circumstances. It does not demonstrate whether or not the Court was
actually more likely to affirm the sentence of death in these cases. Therefore, it is
possible that liberal judges were not significantly more likely to affirm the sentence of
death. In order to examine this possibility, a model for each legal factor is needed to
assess their individual effects on ideology.
Table 2 presents the logistic regression estimates for three separate models of the
Court’s decisions filtered by each of the three specified legal factors. These models not
only allow for in-group examinations of the exact influence of ideology, but they also
permit the remaining variables to vary across groups since they are no longer held
constant against the legal variables as they were in the previous models.
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The findings are fairly consistent with those in the full (interaction) model. The
first model, murder with no extenuating circumstances, again reveals no relationship
between ideology and the Court’s decision to either affirm or overturn the sentence of
death. It does, however, indicate a positive relationship between the presence of pro deo
counsel and the Court’s affirmation of the death sentence. Although the coefficient of
PRODEO is in its expected positive direction, it is only significant at the .10 level,
indicating a modest relationship between pro deo counsel and the Court’s decisions.
Table 2. Legal Models of Death Penalty Decisions in the South African Appellate
Division, 1950-1990
Murder No
Murder With
Other Serious
Extenuating
Extenuating
Crimes
Variable
b
s.e.
b
s.e.
b
s.e.
PANLIB

-0.289

4.331

-4.915**

2.253

16.189+

8.736

DEFRACE

-0.116

0.662

-1.119+++

0.456

-1.532

2.151

DEFMALE

6.519

22.246

8.271

20.489

--------

--------

VICFEM

0.171

0.994

1.320*

0.845

10.115

65.992

VICMALE

-0.650

0.939

0.612

0.786

8.900

66.013

PRODEO

1.101*

0.586

-0.767

0.495

-2.396

1.950

TRIAL

-1.440

1.214

-0.372

0.710

0.976

1.641

ADGRANT

-0.952

1.295

-1.295*

0.797

-3.011

2.661

Intercept

-4.999

22.353

-4.916

20.521

-12.775

66.041

Pseudo R2
Chi Square
N

0.125
9.044
68

0.193
26.974***
126

*** prob. <0.01, using a 1-tailed test; +++ prob. <0.01, using a 2-tailed test
** prob. <0.05, using a 1-tailed test; ++ prob. <0.05, using a 2-tailed test
* prob. <0.10, using a 1-tailed test; + prob. <0.10, using a 2-tailed test
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0.407
11.485*
22

The second model, murder with extenuating circumstances, is perhaps the most
important set of findings. First, the ideology coefficient is highly significant (at the .01
level) and in its expected negative direction. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the
Court was more likely to overturn the sentence of death in cases wherein judicial
discretion was statutorily permitted. The effect of race is particularly pronounced within
this model as well, as is evidenced by the highly significant (at the .01 level) negative
coefficient of DEFRACE. Similar to previous findings, this relationship again suggests
that the Court was more likely to overturn the death sentence for nonwhite defendants.
Other interesting findings include the effects of both the status of the victim and
the leave of appeal granted by the Appellate Division. The positive coefficient of the
VICFEML variable is consistent with theoretical expectations that the Court would be
more likely to affirm the death penalty in cases in which the victim was either a child or
female. The negative coefficient of ADGRANT (significant at the .10 level) reveals that
the Court was more likely to overturn the death sentence when it granted the leave to
appeal than when the trial court granted the appeal.
The third and final model, “other serious crimes,” reveals one critical finding,
which is that a significant relationship may not exist between ideology and the Court’s
decision to affirm the death penalty in this particular set of cases. In the full (interactive)
model

the

interaction

between

panel

ideology

and

other

serious

crimes

(PANLIB*OTHER) was both positive and highly significant, indicating that liberal
panels might have been more likely to affirm the death penalty. Within this final model
the coefficient for PANLIB is again in a positive direction, but now it is only significant
at the .10 level, suggesting a modest relationship between ideology and the Court’s
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decision in other serious cases. While this finding is theoretically perplexing, it does not
necessarily exist given the instability of the model. There are only 22 OTHER cases out
of a total of 216 death penalty cases included within the various analyses. Therefore, it
may be that this anomaly is simply a result of a small sample size, which makes the
model unstable and the finding particularly questionable.22

22

GENDER drops out of the analysis because of a lack of variation within this set of cases.

34

DISCUSSION
So what do these various findings suggest? First of all, the significant effect of
ideology reveals that extralegal factors were indeed at play within the decision-making
process of the Appellate Division. Thus the attitudinal model posited by scholars of the
American courts is certainly applicable to the South African legal system. But as also
demonstrated by the American context, ideology is merely one facet of a more complex
process, and the various other findings to emerge from the analyses are indicative of this
complexity.
For instance, the effect of ideology was modest within the initial analysis but
became more prevalent once the cases were filtered by the specified legal factors.
Moreover, ideology had a particularly strong and significant effect in murder cases
involving extenuating circumstances and was only marginally related to the other legal
stimuli.

What are the implications of these findings?

South Africa’s provision of

extenuating circumstances provided a built-in mechanism for judicial discretion, so it is
clear why ideology was particularly significant within this given context.

One

implication then is that ideology had a more pronounced effect where discretion was
statutorily permitted—in the presence of extenuating circumstances—but had less of an
effect given the institutional constraints of the law—in the absence of extenuating
circumstances.

A second implication is that the findings are consistent with the

attitudinal model supporting its generalizability to other legal contexts.
Another key finding to emerge from the results is that death penalty sentencing in
the Appellate Division may have been contingent upon the race of the victim, particularly
if the defendant was nonwhite. The results indicate that the death penalty was more likely
35

to have been overturned for nonwhite defendants—a finding that is clearly inconsistent
with theoretical expectations. So why did this opposite effect occur? There are several
possible explanations.
First, little is known about the origin or background of each particular death
penalty case. Applying yet another theory derived from the American context, it may be
that race was used as a factor in the disposition of the case and that nonwhites were more
likely to be both indicted for and convicted of capital murder (Redelet 1981; Paternoster
1984; Haynie and Dover 1994). If this is true, the Appellate Division may have been
more likely to overturn the death sentence in attempt to remedy an egregious bias based
upon race found in the court below. Conversely, it may be that racism is evident in the
Court’s decisions because white judges held white defendants to be more culpable than
the less “cultured” and therefore less culpable “native.” This colonial paternalism could
also potentially explain the results. In order to fully assess these potential relationships,
future research should attempt to focus on the effects of race within the lower court
systems.
Another possibility is that courts in authoritarian systems may function differently
than those in democratic systems. Yet in either type of system, judges generally reside
within a political context, and in the case of South Africa, one that was deeply entrenched
in apartheid. It is possible then that the judges of the Appellate Division, recognizing the
inevitable demise of a regime based on this system, chose to utilize their powers of
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judicial discretion to challenge the authoritarian regime and status quo of apartheid by
consistently ruling in favor of the nonwhite defendants.23
Similarly, the Court may have ruled in favor of the political “underdog” in an
attempt to both exhibit its independence from the authoritarian regime and defend its
legitimacy to the world (Haynie 1994; 1995).24 How might have this occurred? The
Appellate Division, although structurally weakened and clearly plagued by the political
influences of the National Party, often served as the final authority in the implementation
of the government’s repressive apartheid policies. It may be that the Court used its
limited power of review to thwart the government’s advances in the apartheid policy area.
Based on its previous collisions with the government, however, this defiance would have
had to be limited. As a result, the negative effect of race demonstrates that cases
involving the death penalty may have been one area of the Court’s docket subtly used to
exert its independence from the government
Several of the expected relationships do not, however, materialize within the
analyses.

For instance, a significant relationship was not fully established between

litigant resources, as operationalized by pro deo counsel, and death penalty outcomes. In
light of this finding, can it be concluded that the American theories of litigant resources

23

Relatedly, Helmke’s (2002) research on the Argentine Supreme Court provides evidence that courts in
authoritarian systems function differently than those in democratic systems. She posits a theory of
“strategic defection,” whereby the Court, motivated by its lack of independence from the dictatorship, will
attempt to distance itself from a failing regime—or when faced by “institutional insecurity”—by
consistently ruling against it throughout its demise (300).

24

This assumption is based on the findings of Haynie (1994; 1995) who discovered that the Philippine
Supreme Court, a Court also embedded within an authoritarian system, was less likely to defer to the
regime and more likely to find in favor of the “underdog.” One possibility raised is that the Court was
concerned with the perception of its legitimacy and was willing to assert its independence from the regime
in order to enhance its perceived legitimacy.
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are not applicable to the South African legal system? This study suggests that perhaps
they are not, or at least not in terms of appointed counsel.
Yet the failure to determine the role of litigant resources may be indicative of a
much larger theoretical concern. Theoretically, it may be that some pro deo advocates
are consistently appointed as counsel in death penalty cases before the Court, thus
enabling them to overcome their purported “one-shotter” status within the legal
profession and, concomitantly, achieve “repeat player” status within the context of the
Court. The implication of this argument is that the effect of litigant resources derived
from either pro deo or non-appointed counsel in the Court’s decisions would have been
equalized, thus resulting in the lack of significant differences among the case outcomes.
To test this possibility, however, future research should include a more systematic
analysis of the individual advocates participating in each case.
Furthermore, the victim and defendant characteristics did not seem to play a
significant role within the judicial decision-making process of the Appellate Division.
Unlike the American context, no effects of either the defendants’ gender or the status of
the victim were evident overall within the Court’s decisions. However, these results must
be tempered for several reasons.
First, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which victim characteristics matter
within the sentencing process, given the available data required to test these effects.
Studies of the American courts have successfully demonstrated the significant influences
of victim characteristics through the use of additional measures such as age, race and
income. Others have even measured the effects of victim characteristics coupled with
defendant characteristics (e.g., Haynie and Dover 1992).
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Yet similar types of

examinations are not feasible within the context of South Africa, because these data are
not consistently provided within the Appellate Division’s decisions. Therefore, future
research should attempt to incorporate additional information likely to be included in the
decisions of the lower or trial courts.
Similar concerns arise with respect to the defendants’ gender. Methodologically,
it may be that there is not sufficient variation among the cases to accurately test the
relationship between gender and death penalty sentencing. On the other hand, it may be
that females are, at least theoretically, less violent than males and thus less likely to
commit acts that warrant the death penalty. Therefore, it may be methodologically
impossible or perhaps even theoretically irrelevant to test the effects of gender on the
death penalty sentencing in South Africa. Nevertheless, future research should attempt to
focus on an issue area of law that may be more conducive to capturing the effects of
gender within the sentencing process.
A final hypothesis tested was the source from which the leave to appeal to the
Appellate Division was granted. The type of appeal seems to be somewhat related to
cases involving murder with extenuating circumstances, since it appears that the Court
was more willing overturn the sentence of death when it granted the leave to appeal. This
may have occurred because these types of cases included a clear basis for which the
reversal could be justified—extenuating circumstances—in contrast to cases deemed
more difficult to overturn, i.e., those where the death penalty was statutorily mandated.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to examine the impact of political influences
within the judicial decision-making process of South Africa’s highest court, the Appellate
Division.

In order to accomplish this goal, several theories of judicial behavior

developed within the American context have been extrapolated to and tested within the
legal system of South Africa. Consequently, the results have yielded several interesting
findings regarding the role of the law and politics within this comparative framework.
What can be concluded then about judicial decision making in South Africa’s
Appellate Division and, further, about our theoretical understanding of judicial behavior?
First, while this study certainly does not depict the full account upon which the Appellate
Division based its decisions, it does provide a preliminary insight into the functioning of
judicial decision making within South Africa’s formerly authoritarian regime.

The

findings reveal that the Appellate Division’s sentencing process was certainly susceptible
to extralegal factors or, more broadly, the politics that have been similarly found to exist
within the U.S. legal system. Yet the findings also reveal that judicial decision making
within South Africa is constrained to some extent by the institutional constraints of the
law.
Finally, this study suggests that the U.S. legal system is not simply an anomaly
within a larger comparative context and that theories derived from studies of the U.S.
courts can be exported and applied to other court systems as well. Yet it is only through
the continual exportation of these theories to broader comparative frameworks that
scholars can begin to fully generalize about judicial behavior.

40

REFERENCES
Albonetti, Celesta A. 1997. “Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines: Effects of
Defendant Characteristics.” Law and Society Review 31 (4): 789-822.
Blackstone, William. [1765-69] 1979. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Volume I.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brace, Paul and Melinda Gann Hall. 1995. “Studying Courts Comparatively: The View
of the American States.” Political Research Quarterly 48 (1): 5-29.
---------1997. “The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the
Politics of Judicial Choice.” The Journal of Politics 59 (4): 1206-1031.
Brennar, Saul and Marc Stier. 1996. “Retesting Segal and Spaeth’s Stare Decisis Model.”
American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1036-1048.
Brisbin, Richard A. 1996. “Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in
Supreme Court Decision Making.” American Journal of Political Science 40(4):
1004-1017.
Cardozo, Benjamin N. 1921. The Nature of the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale
University Press, Ch. 1.
Clarke, Steven H. and Gary G. Koch. 1976. “The Influence of Income and Other Factors
on Whether Criminal Defendants go to Prison.” Law and Society Review 11: 5792.
Cohen, M.R. 1914. “The Process of Judicial Legislation.” American Law Review 68:161198.
Dugard, John. 1977. South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume IV:
Introduction to Criminal Procedure. Cape Town: Juta & Co., Limited.
---------1978. Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Ellmann, Stephen. 1992. In A Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa’s State of
Emergency. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Emmert, Craig F. and Carol Ann Traut. 1994. “The California Supreme Court and The
Death Penalty.” American Politics Quarterly 22 (1): 41-61.
Epp, Charles. 1998. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

41

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make. Washington DC:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Farrell, Ronald A. and Victoria L. Swigert. 1986. “Adjudication in Homicide: An
Interpretive Analysis of the Effects of Defendant and Victim Social
Characteristics.” Journal of Researching Crime and Delinquency 38 (1): 349-369.
Forsyth, Christopher. 1985. In Danger for Their Talents: A Study of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, 1950-1980. Cape Town: Juta &
Co, Ltd.
Galanter, Marc. 1974. “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change.” Law and Society Review 9: 95-160.
George, Tracey E. and Lee Epstein. 1992. “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision
Making.” American Political Science Review 86: 323-337.
Gibson, James L. 1978. “Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An
Interactive Model.” The American Political Science Review 72 (3): 911-924.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira and Vanessa A. Baird. 1998. “On the Legitimacy
of National High Courts.” American Political Science Review 92 (2): 343-358.
Giles, Micheal W. and Thomas D. Lancaster. 1989. “Political Transition, Social
Development, and Legal Mobilization in Spain.” The American Political Science
Review 83 (3): 817-833.
Hall, Melinda Gann and Paul Brace. 1994. “The Vicissitudes of Death by Decree: Forces
Influencing Capital Punishment Decision Making in State Supreme Courts.”
Social Science Quarterly 75 (1): 136- 151.
Hall, Melinda Gann and Paul Brace. 1996. “Justices’ Responses to Case Facts: An
Interactive Model.” American Politics Quarterly 24 (2): 237-261.
Haynie, Stacia L. 1994. “Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in the Philippine
Supreme Court.” The Journal of Politics 56 (3): 752-772.
---------1995. “Resource Inequalities and Regional Variation in Litigation Outcomes in
the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961-1986.” Political Research Quarterly 48: 371380.
---------2003. Judging in Black and White: Decision Making in the South African
Appellate Division, 1950-1990. Peter Lange Publishing. Forthcoming.

42

Haynie, Stacia L. and Ernest A. Dover. 1992. “Prosecutorial Discretion and Press
Coverage: The Decision to Try the Case.” American Politics Quarterly 22 (3):
370-381.
Haynie, Stacia L., Stephenie E. Franks and Keith Nordyke. 2002. “Explaining the Death
Penalty Decisions of the United States Supreme Court.” Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, New Orleans,
LA, March 28-30.
Hiemstra, V.G. 1997. Introduction to the Law of Criminal Procedure. Durban:
Butterworth and Co.
Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. “The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations
in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy.” American Political Science
Review 96 (2): 291-303.
Kleck, Gary. 1981. “Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation
with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty.” American Sociological Review
46(6): 733-805.
Knight, Jack and Lee Epstein. 1996. “The Norm of Stare Decisis.” American Journal of
Political Science 40 (4): 1018-1035.
Llewellyn, Karl. 1931. “Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound.”
Harvard Law Review 44:1222-1264.
Maltzman, Forrest and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1996. “Strategic Policy Considerations and
Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court.” American Political Science Review 90:
581-592.
McGuire, Kevin T. 1995. “Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success.” The Journal of Politics 57 (1): 187196.
---------1998. “Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court.” Political
Research Quarterly 51 (2): 505-526.
McQuoid-Mason, D.J. 1982. An Outline of Legal Aid in South Africa. Durban:
Butterworth & Co. Ltd.
Mishler, William and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1993. “The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions.” The American Political Science Review 87 (1): 87-101.
Murphy, Walter F. 1964. Elements of Judicial Strategy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

43

Paternoster, Raymond. 1984. “Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty.”
Law and Society Review 18 (3): 347-478.
Perry, H.W. 1991. Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme
Court. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pound, Roscoe. 1910. “Law in Books and Law in Action.” Harvard Law Review 44:1236.
---------1922. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. New Haven: Yale University
Press, Ch. 3.
Redelet, Michael L. 1981. “Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death
Penalty.” American Sociological Review 46 (6): 918-927.
Rohde, David W. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1976. Supreme Court Decision Making. San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Schubert, Glendon. 1964. “A Psychological Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making.”
In Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, Glendon Schubert, ed.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Segal, Jeffrey. 1984. “Predicting Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure
Cases, 1962-1981.” The American Political Science Review 78 (4): 891-900.
---------1986. “Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers: And IndividualLevel Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases.” The Journal of Politics 48 (4):
938-955.
Segal, Jeffrey A. and Albert D. Cover 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices.” The American Political Science Review 83 (2):
557-565.
Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.
---------2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Segal, Jeffrey A., Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, and Harold J. Spaeth. 1995.
“Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited.” The
Journal of Politics 57 (3): 812-823.

44

Sheehan, Reginald S., William Mishler, and Donald R. Songer. 1992. “Ideology, Status,
and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court.” The
American Political Science Review 86 (2): 464-471.
Songer, Donald R. and Susan Haire. 1992. “Integrating Alternative Approaches to the
Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.”
American Journal of Political Science 36 (4): 963-982.
---------1994. “A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in
the Courts of Appeals.” The Journal of Politics 56 (2): 425-439.
Songer, Donald R. and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. “Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals.” American Journal of
Political Science 36(1): 235-258.
Songer, Donald R. and Stefanie A. Lindquist. 1996. “Not the Whole Story: The Impact
of Justices’ Values on Supreme Court Decision Making.” American Journal of
Political Science 40 (4): 1049-1063.
Tate, C. Neal. 1981. “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 19461978.” American Political Science Review 75:355-67.
Tate, C. Neal and Torbjörn Vallinder. 1995. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.
New York: New York University Press.
Theron, Roelien, Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Hugh Corder. 1991. Death by Decree: South
Africa and the Death Penalty. Cape Town: SADPSA, SJRP & The Institute of
Criminology, University of Cape Town.
Toharia, José J. 1975. “Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The case of
Contemporary Spain.” Law and Society Review Spring: 475-496.
Traut, Carol Ann and Craig F. Emmert. 1998. “Expanding the Integrated Model of
Judicial Decision Making: The California Justices and Capital Punishment.” The
Journal of Politics 60 (4): 1166-1180.
Van Niekerk, B.V.D. 1969. “…Hanged by the Neck Until You are Dead: Some
Thoughts on the Application of the Death Penalty in South Africa.” The South
African Law Journal 86: 457-475.
---------1970. “…Hanged by the Neck Until You are Dead: Some Thoughts on the
Application of the Death Penalty in South Africa.” The South African Law
Journal 87: 60-75.

45

APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

MURDER

220

0

1

0.314

0.465

MURDEXT

220

0

1

0.577

0.495

OTHER

220

0

1

0.109

0.313

PANLIB

220

0.29

0.79

0.424

0.086

DEFRACE

217

0

1

0.073

0.440

GENDER

219

0

1

0.980

0.130

VICFEML

220

0

1

0.390

0.490

VICMALE

220

0

1

0.520

0.500

PRODEO

220

0

1

0.700

0.460

TRIAL

220

0

1

0.659

0.475

ADGRANT

220

0

1

0.236

0.426

Variable

Valid N
(listwise)

216
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APPENDIX B
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS
Variable

MURDER

Frequency

Percent

No Extenuating
Circumstances

69

68.6

Otherwise

151

31.4

0

0

220

100

Extenuating
Circumstances

127

42.3

Otherwise

93

57.7

System Missing

0

0

220

100

Other Serious
Crimes

24

89.1

Otherwise

196

10.9

0

0

220

100

White

58

26.4

Non-White

159

72.3

3

1.4

220

100

System Missing
Total

MURDEXT

Total

OTHER

System Missing
Total

DEFRACE

System Missing
Total

47

Variable

Frequency

Percent

215

97.7

Female

4

1.8

System Missing

1

0.5

220

100.0

Female or Child

85

38.6

Otherwise (male or
missing)

135

61.4

0

0

220

100

Male

115

52.3

Otherwise (female,
child or missing)

105

47.7

0

0

220

100

Pro Deo Counsel

154

70.0

Private Counsel

66

30.0

System Missing

0

0

220

100

Trial Court Grants
Leave

145

34.1

Otherwise (A.D.
Grant or missing)

75

65.9

System Missing

0

0

220

100

Male
GENDER

Total

VICFEMAL

System Missing
Total

VICMALE

System Missing
Total

PRODEO

Total

TRIGRANT

Total

48

Variable

ADGRANT

Frequency

Percent

A.D. Grants Leave

52

23.6

Otherwise (Trial
Court Grant or
missing)

168

76.4

System Missing

0

Total

49

220

0
100

APPENDIX C
LIST OF ALL DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS, 1950-1990
CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

5810616
6040723
5130028
5130158
5310382
5330303
5340523
5340552
5410370
5410455
5420320
5520152
5530274
5530284
5540196
5630411
5710399
5710458
5720223
5730772
5740265
5740642
5740727
5820273
5830102
5830107
5840353
5840461
5840471
5910894
5920227
5920322
5920352
5920448
5930376
5940483

500619
500815
510518
510521
521212
530528
531003
531003
531211
531211
540308
550302
550516
550524
550822
560611
561111
561213
570304
570726
570912
570927
571230
580310
580512
580508
580924
581002
580930
581202
590309
590302
590324
590326
590612
590924
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CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

6010752
6030535
6040776
6110460
6120209
6210312
6220380
6240533
6310692
6330188
6330631
6340856
6340877
6420783
6510082
6510209
6510215
6610831
6520340
6540688
6540692
6610507
6620297
6620433
6630140
6710387
6710435
6710440
6740566
6810495
6810545
6810666
6820576
6830250
6840708
6910561
6920637
6920632
6940085
6940421
7010430

591217
600530
600930
601206
601202
611120
620305
620910
620827
630328
630527
630923
630926
631206
640929
641001
641001
641108
650301
650602
650930
651215
660304
660324
660512
661125
661125
661124
670930
671204
671201
671208
680308
680521
681001
681203
681121
690331
690711
690923
691125
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CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

7020654
7030476
7030529
7110798
7130769
7140646
7220839
7220898
7230331
7230611
7240551
7310148
7310796
7440204
7440732
7530208
7540553
7540564
7540567
7610496
7620580
7620587
7630644
7640721
7710754
7720348
7730510
7730807
7740240
7810523
7820069
7930308
7820410
7820424
7820607
7820891
7830767
7840075
7840560
7840684

700326
700518
700518
701214
710527
710921
720321
720316
720404
720601
720828
721002
721111
740401
740917
750326
750723
750722
750722
750724
760309
760304
760525
760903
761208
761123
770516
770601
770823
771114
771129
770330
780223
780227
780316
780321
780602
780511
780818
780831
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CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

7910461
7910478
7920656
7920933
7920938
7930047
8010001
8010149
8010938
8020741
8030745
8030755
8030824
8030825
8030829
8030860
8040559
8040604
8040613
8110056
8110959
8120738
8120744
8130011
8130172
8130204
8130353
8130377
8140614
8140851
8210030
8210036
8230113
8230678
8240736
8240744
8330275
8330532
8330610
8330662

780929
781106
780330
781201
790302
790320
791001
790827
791203
800228
800519
800516
800602
800602
800530
800523
800903
800911
800911
800923
801130
800602
800829
810316
810319
810324
810331
810331
810524
810831
810910
810908
820407
820308
820831
820827
830331
830519
830530
830530
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CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

8330717
8410091
8410556
8410583
8420868
8430524
8430666
8440629
8510001
8510009
8510236
8510625
8510805
8520806
8530029
8530222
8530881
8530908
8540767
8630196
8640734
8641188
8720307
8720620
8720663
8730014
8730097
8730490
8730717
8740351
8810037
8810120
8810868
8820151
8820485
8820779
8830190
8830926
8840005
8840010

830530
830929
831117
831117
840322
840511
840525
840903
840925
840925
840928
841129
841130
850307
850326
850328
850529
850530
850916
860326
860828
860930
861128
860313
870312
870326
870331
870527
870521
870525
870922
870922
871201
871126
870825
880311
880329
880525
880329
880330
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CITATION
Year, Volume, Page
(e.g., 5810616 = 1958, Volume 1, p. 616)

DATE
Year, Month & Date
(e.g., June 19, 1950 = 500619)

8910268
8910669
8910687
8910821
8910939
8920022
8920043
8920096
8930420
8920863
8930695
8930712
8930720
8940356
8941013
9010032
9010832
9030185
9040709
9040727
9040735
9110169
9110517
9120093

880930
880527
880930
881123
881125
881117
881124
881122
881129
890321
890601
890524
890529
890530
890905
890918
891130
900326
900913
900917
900918
900928
901116
901130
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